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The Environmental Paradox of the
Welfare State: The Dynamics of
Sustainability
DANIEL BAILEY
Thus far, there has been a reluctance to instigate a dialogue and engage with the
tensions between two literatures with significant insights for each other. The first is
the literature on the fiscal sustainability of welfare states, which is invariably pre-
dicated upon future growth primarily to manage demographic changes. The
second is the post-growth literature, which has enjoyed a renaissance in recent
years due to an environmental critique of economic growth. Both literatures
contain implications for the analysis of welfare state sustainability. The primary
contribution of this paper will be to explore the intractability of the tensions
between these discourses and the difficulty of mapping out a progressive policy
direction in the twenty-first century which meets both our environmental and
social sensibilities. It is claimed that in the post-industrial world the fiscal sustain-
ability of welfare capitalism is dependent upon public expenditure financed
indirectly an environmentally unsustainable growth dynamic, but that ironically
any conflagration of public welfare programmes is likely to be counter-productive
as the welfare state is able to promote de-carbonisation strategies and notions of
the public good as well as promoting monetarily and ecologically efficient
public welfare services.
Keywords: welfare state, post-growth, environmental sustainability, fiscal sus-
tainability, climate change, beyond GDP
Introduction
Despite both being embraced primarily by those on the left, the body of work on
the fiscal sustainability of welfare states and the post-growth literature have, thus
far, remained segregated from each other. The former is centred on fiscal viability
with progressives typically prescribing additional state expenditure financed by
further economic growth in order to address demographic changes or economic
crises, or promote inclusive development more generally. Currently, quasi-
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Keynesian strategies (aligned to a prominent role for welfarism as part of a crisis
management approach) are central to this perceived crisis of growth. The latter is
concerned with a crisis for growth and prescribes a curtailment of economic
expansion in order to ward off further environmental degradation and the onset
of climate change; a position which significantly problematises the solutions of
the former. These prominent progressive discourses have, thus far, only fleetingly
spoken to each other. In an attempt to engage with their insights and frictions, and
in an attempt to decipher how we should think about welfare state sustainability,
this paper will explore the following questions:
. How fiscally sustainable are welfare states in the transition to environmental
sustainability, if this entails a transition to post-growth?
. Are the effects of demographic changes and climate change manageable in a fis-
cally constrained post-growth society?
. If welfare state retrenchment is the implicit corollary of a post-growth tran-
sition, what are the socio-environmental implications of this?
. How should the environmental critique of the post-growth movement impact
upon the way we analyse welfare state sustainability?
Indeed, it is remarkable that these questions have not previously been posed. This
article does not claim to offer definitive answers to these questions, but hopes to
offer a clear account of the problematic and prompt a preliminary debate. Silence
on these issues will no longer do.
Ian Gough has done most to pioneer the inchoate literature that does exist on the
socio-economic and environmental effects of climate change on social policy.
Gough has thrown light onto the substantial carbon footprints of welfare services
and the need to decarbonise, the abilities of different welfare state typologies to
handle increased demands, and the need to encompass climate change and
social policy goals within welfare programmes and broader paths of development
(Gough et al. 2008, Gough 2010, 2011a, 2011b, 2013a, Gough and Therborn 2010,
Gough and Meadowcroft 2011).
Yet the relationship between social policy and environmental policy may not be
as symbiotic as has previously been implicitly assumed. This is particularly the
case if an environmentally sustainable economy which operates within the par-
ameters of the biosphere cannot be reconciled with ad infinitum economic
growth; as is suggested by the proponents of the post-growth tradition of thought.1
Although the environmental crisis and its relationship with economic growth
clearly pre-date the financial crash, the post-growth and de-growth literatures
have enjoyed a renaissance since 2008. Authors such as Victor (2008), Jackson
(2009), Latouche (2009) and Simms (2013) have built on the work of Mishan
and Mishan (1967), Meadows et al. (1972), Boulding (1981) and Daly (1972,
1977) to offer sophisticated critiques of growth-centric systems in post-industrial
countries which invite potentially calamitous environmental, social and economic
risks. Pointing to the wealth of empirical evidence that suggests that economic
growth is environmentally unsustainable and that the decoupling of growth
from carbon output is without precedent and extremely unlikely, they offer bold
and provocative visions of economic reform.
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Yet the ramifications of making a transition to a post-growth economy (and
subsequently deliberately suppressing levels of taxable economic activity) for
public finances and welfare states are scarcely recognised. If decarbonisation
cannot be reconciled with economic growth, this poses serious problems for the
tax base from which public sector spending is funded, particularly in (or
because largely because of) the context of an ageing society in which costs
were projected to escalate anyway. With welfare states (particularly existing
pension and healthcare commitments) in their current form predicated on upon
a growth in ‘the tax take’ and the transition to post-growth likely to add their
own strains onto welfare services – both of which will be expanded upon
shortly – this mooted economic reform is likely to curtail the state’s fiscal
capacity at a time of growing welfare need. The fiscal sustainability of the
public welfarism consequently seems to rest profoundly upon an environmentally
unsustainable growth dynamic. It looks as though the welfare state, and public
spending is general, is a problem for the post-growth literature which is not
being explored because the fear is the implications may be to problematise the tra-
ditional tools of progressive politics. Meanwhile, the radical uncertainty surround-
ing economic growth seems to pose just a great as a problem for the welfare state
literature, which has normalised a political position rooted within the parameters
of a business-as-usual form of economics.
This paper will attempt to adopt a more holistic understanding of the contem-
porary economic challenges faced today (i.e. the environmental as well as the
economic and fiscal) before delving into a practical plane of analysis (involving
a series of imperfect but analytically useful ceteris paribus assumptions) which
demonstrate how problematic these challenges and economic constraints are to
negotiate within the framework of the current political and economic settlements
of the post-industrial world.
Synthesising notions of fiscal and environmental sustainability into welfare
state analysis breeds a new paradox for welfarism. If we are to reduce levels of
(taxable) economic activity as post-growth theorists suggest, we ceteris paribus
threaten the public sector funding base of welfare states and impede the state’s tra-
ditional mechanisms of ‘crisis management’. Simultaneously, the welfare state is
required more so than ever in what could be a tumultuous transitional period, not
only in terms of protecting society’s poorest and most vulnerable but also in terms
of facilitating decarbonisation attempts and providing efficient modes of insuring
against a confluence of socio-economic and environmental risks. We, thus, have a
scenario where it is problematic for welfare states to be financed by (or to justify)
environmentally unsustainable growth, whilst welfare states themselves must be
regarded as crucial transitional mechanisms. Current levels of welfare expenditure
may be considered fiscally unsustainable but ironically it may be that welfare state
atrophy should be considered environmentally unsustainable.
I will start by exploring the fiscal ramifications of the transition to a post-growth
economy on the public finances and the constraints this imposes upon public wel-
farism, before discussing the extent to which this funding gap can be addressed
within orthodox monetary frameworks. I will then conversely analyse the poten-
tial consequences of cutbacks in welfare expenditure in exacerbating socio-
environmental risks, in order to assess the sustainability of welfare state
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retrenchment. Situating the conclusion on the crux of this sustainability paradox, I
will suggest that maintaining the realist-inspired ontological centrality of the state
may no longer be optimal when analysing and constructing welfare policy, and
argue that post-growth makes a renewal of welfarism through multiple layers of
governance more urgent than ever before.
The environmental unsustainability of welfare capitalism
The proposition of the post-growth literature is that tackling climate change is not
reconcilable with further economic growth and there is a great deal of empirical
evidence to support this hypothesis.
Economic growth carries a significant carbon footprint and currently uses
unsustainable levels of natural resources (IPCC 2012). The New Economics Foun-
dation reported that ‘it takes the Earth almost 18 months to produce the ecological
services that humanity uses in one year’ (NEF 2011: 5). Adopting a business-as-
usual approach to economics in spite of this environmental degradation – which
appears to be broadly the consensus amongst the major political parties of the
post-industrial welfare societies – is forecast to produce the exacerbation of pro-
cesses which may ultimately frustrate economic efficiency even in its own terms;
leading to large reductions in GDP across the world (Stern 2007).
A discourse of green growth realised through a variety of technical fixes has
long been the (largely implicit) mainstream political riposte to the tensions
between the economic and the environmental, but there is a great deal of empirical
evidence to suggest that the ‘easy compatibility between economic growth and
climate change [which underlines the green growth discourse] is an illusion’
(Helm 2009: 11).
Whilst ‘greening’ the processes of capitalism is the implicit source of hope for
continuing status quo high-consumption lifestyles, achieving growth without
expending resources and increasing carbon output has no historical precedent
and, thus far, decoupling growth from carbon on the scale required has failed to
materialise (Jackson 2009: 14). Any improvement in carbon efficiency has been
entirely overshadowed by the effects of further growth and post-industrial
countries have only succeeded in reducing their own national carbon footprints
through ‘outsourcing’ manufacturing to countries such as China (Helm 2012).
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development adopted a global
outlook and calculated that in order to keep below the 28C climate threshold,
the carbon intensity of each dollar’s worth of output would have to fall from
770 g to just 6 g . . . requiring a daunting 11 per cent average annual reduction
in carbon intensity (Simms 2013: 276). Post-growth theorists, therefore, are extre-
mely sceptical of any slogans of ‘green growth’ or ‘sustainable growth’ in terms of
how achievable and universalisable such concepts are (Victor 2008, Latouche
2009, Jackson 2009). Consequently, there should be no a priori assumption that
the recent absence of growth was a temporary interlude from the economic
equilibrium.
Some have claimed that environmental clean-up projects may actually boost
GDP growth as it is a significant economic space for potential productivity
growth, investment and demand; based on the observation that GDP is
Daniel Bailey
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fundamentally an aggregated measurement of revenue flows rather than capital
stocks. Yet public sector environmental protection expenditure is hardly a
major driver of GDP, but even if it were it is not the type of economic activity
which would profit the Exchequer, as most environmental clean-up programmes
would not be taxable private sector activity but either heavily subsidised or
entirely state-funded projects. Indeed, it would most likely add to the competition
between government ministries for budget financing rather than provide a sustain-
able tax base for enabling state expenditure.
Even the costs of climate change adaptation (rather than the mitigation enabled
by a post-growth transition) could, ironically, be enough to eradicate growth in
many countries. The IPCC (2014: 19) estimated that the costs of adaptation
could be 2 per cent of global GDP per annum or higher, substantial enough to
choke off growth in some parts of the world.
This ecological reasoning dovetails with pre-existing and more narrowly
economic concerns above the trend towards a long-term slowdown in growth
since the 1970s; a fear articulated by Gordon (2012), Cowen (2011) and
Streeck (2014). This only serves to underline the importance of countenancing
a world without the bountiful levels of growth we became accustomed to before
2007.
Post-growth theorists tend to be sanguine about prospects of living without
economic expansion primarily because growth has long been decoupled from
wellbeing and it is believed other metrics could offer a more substantial index
of development. Yet it may well be the case that there are wellbeing costs to
not having economic growth; one of which may be that public spending can no
longer be financed to quite the same extent.
The fiscal pressures of the transition to post-growth
The authors associated with the post-growth literature have offered a compelling
vision of economic change rooted in a critique of a priori neo-classical understand-
ings of wellbeing. Yet the elephant in the room in such discussions is that the tran-
sition to post-growth means a reduction in taxable economic activity and a
circumscribed fiscal capacity for state actors.
Welfare state expansion in recent years, primarily due to demographic press-
ures manifested in the increased costs of public pensions and public health care,
has been aided enormously by economic expansion, which has allowed politicians
to avoid countenancing unpopular tax hikes or dedicating a greater proportion of
state resources to welfare services.
In recent decades, the growth rates experienced by Western economies have
only been marginally inferior to the growth of spending, and if growth can be
maintained it is fair to suggest that the additional fiscal burdens upon welfare ser-
vices due to demographic pressures are not insuperable (Taylor-Gooby 2013: 75).
The absence of growth, however, would render welfare commitments increas-
ingly prohibitive as well as potentially endangering a host of private sector jobs
dependent on corporate profit. As Latouche (2009: 16) fleetingly acknowledged,
‘jobs, retirement pensions and increased public spending (education, law and
The Environmental Paradox of the Welfare State
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order, justice, culture, transport, health, etc.) all presuppose a constant rise in
Gross Domestic Product’.
An ageing population is key here as it makes the prospect of this transition sig-
nificantly more difficult than would have otherwise have been the case. Although
the counter-factual would still have prompted challenges, it would have been far
easier if a constant level of welfare generosity could have been assumed.
However, this is not the case and we cannot afford to postpone climate change
mitigation until the demographic make-up of post-industrial countries have
changed.
In fact, the fiscal position of some states may be even worse than this. Even in
the ‘boom’ years, it became politically normalised in a host of European countries
to consistently run budget deficits. The UK, Germany, Italy and France have
achieved a meagre and diminishing number of budget surpluses since the 1970s
– a trend which perhaps substantiates Schumpeterian fears – and this suggests
that even current levels of public spending would be rendered unsustainable if
growth were to be choked off in the immediate future.
Such a scenario of instantaneous post-growth is admittedly highly improbable if
not impossible. Any transition to post-growth must be an incremental and non-
linear process. But it remains a crucial point as it illuminates the state of the
public finances heading into such a period of profound transformation. Not only
is future welfare spending predicated on economic expansion, but current levels
of welfare spending are based on assumptions of future expansion as well! The
corollary of restricting (taxable) economic activity is that severe limits would
be imposed upon the ‘tax take’ compared to public expenditure w. This means
that not only future commitments, but even present expenditure levels may be
seen as fiscally unsustainable when circumscribed by post-growth expectations.
Particularly (but not exclusively) in times of recession, welfare spending can be
justified by heterodox economists through reference to quasi-Keynesian concepts
such as macroeconomic stabilisers, counter-cyclical spending and the multiplier
effect. In other words, current state expenditure can be seen as temporary,
counter-cyclical spending designed to revive the locomotives of growth through
re-generating demand and capital investment projects. Budget deficits can, thus,
be remedied by the budgetary surpluses of a future economic boom – allowing
the state to smooth over the business cycle. However, in an economy which recog-
nises the complications of growth it is more difficult to see public debt in such
terms. The end of growth involves challenging the business cycle and thus funda-
mentally problematises the idea of counter-cyclical spending that can be neutral-
ised by future budgetary surpluses.
This includes the budgetary surpluses that have been sustained in recent years
on the premise that future growth would allow us to see the current budget imbal-
ances in Keynesian terms. The public sector debt already accrued has been largely
due to sustaining budget deficits (rather than the re-capitalisation of the banks)
since the financial crisis of 2008 (Hay and Wincott 2011: 220).
It is difficult to disagree with the many commentators who have stated that the
emphasis upon public debt in political discourse is remarkably overstated, and
responds to the symptom rather than the cause of the financial crash (Krugman
2012, Blyth 2013). In an environment where growth is foreseeable, public
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sector debt can be gradually eroded down to sustainable levels by the eventual
increase in taxable economic activity. Yet in the post-growth mindset, where
future growth is being questioned and future budgetary surpluses problematised,
high levels of expenditure and public debt must be seen as being a more structural
facet of the economy.
Public debt is consequently a serious post-growth concern as it becomes synon-
ymous with the ‘structural deficit’; understood today as an estimate of how much
debt will not be eradicated through a return to ‘normal’ growth levels and will thus
need to addressed through austerity measures. To put it another way, if economic
growth is unable to take much of the burden of fiscal consolidation, public debt
will only be eroded through deliberate political action. This would lead to a
deficit reduction plans far more vigorous than the types currently being experi-
enced. This would be true even if the transition to post-growth did not incite
the capricious and potentially punitive reactions of the financial markets and the
credit ratings agencies, which could potentially heighten the cost of borrowing.
Such reactions could well compound these fiscal concerns.
Reducing public debt in a post-growth economy is possible, but it would con-
stitute a significant proportion of state expenditure. Whilst it is possible to main-
tain debt reduction targets in a post-growth economy through prioritising debt
repayments within a state’s budget, this would seem to be extremely problematic
alongside a commitment to maintaining the entirety of welfare expenditure in con-
temporary post-industrial economies.
When a more holistic understanding of the current political economy chal-
lenges is adopted, it is clear that it is more difficult to rationalise any heterodox
progressive response based on re-animating environmentally unsustainable
dynamics of economic growth and counter-cyclical spending to be remedied by
future budgetary surpluses. If the starting point of the post-growth literature is
correct then we must acknowledge the irony that, in the long run, Keynesianism
is dead.
To re-appropriate Offe’s felicitous phrase, this presents a ‘crisis of crisis man-
agement’ in that the welfare state would be, in this context, no longer quite as
potent a tool for responding to and managing the nature of this multi-dimension
and profoundly de-stabilising period of crisis (Offe 1976). The magnitude of
this development cannot be underestimated for progressive politics.
The future national finances of post-industrial countries are subject to numerous
(and sometimes incalculable) unintended consequences and (agential) unpredict-
ability in the political and financial arenas. And we should remain aware that his-
torically welfare reform has not followed economic change in a deterministic way
(Cox 2001, Hay and Watson 2003). Institutional structures and the ideas held
about fiscal constraints tend to play key roles in dictating public policy and so
reform would remain a politically contingent and heterogeneous path, rather
than economically inexorable one. However, even with these caveats in mind it
is axiomatic that post-growth transitions would place certain structural constraints
upon government spending. Welfare states, as large constituents of state expendi-
tures, will be subject to strenuous fiscal audits.
Indeed, this is why growth has for so long been seen as the great palliative of
politics. The elixir of growth can reduce national deficits, fund welfare
The Environmental Paradox of the Welfare State
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programmes, reduce unemployment and a whole range of other remedial benefits.
The end of growth may be economically unavoidable or environmentally necess-
ary, but it brings substantial headaches to policy-makers tasked with allocating
scarce resources. These are repercussions seldom acknowledged by those pro-
pounding a post-growth vision of the future.
Of course, a plethora of subsidiary consequences emerge from this transition
which invites an amalgam of unstable forces. Many scholars do not even consider
a post-growth economic system to be a capitalist one – although crucially many
post-growth authors such as Daly (1972), Victor (2008) and Jackson (2009) do –
but what is clear is that the consequences of a post-growth transition to a society
which continues to respect capitalist concepts such as debt relations and balanced
budgets are extremely difficult to project. It seems fair to forecast, however, that
the pressures upon the welfare budget will be compounded by a loss of private
sector jobs, uncertainties over asset-based welfare and private pensions based
on investments in any of the transitional countries, potentially punitive reactions
from credit rating agencies and financial institutions, and cuts elsewhere in state
spending which may generate dangerous feedback loops adding strains upon
numerous welfare benefits. Victor (2008) through his attempts to model various
economic scenarios under conditions of zero growth has been a key figure in
exploring these themes. Looking at the Canadian economy specifically, Victor
forecast varying degrees of concerning consequences for unemployment,
poverty, incomes, debt levels, investment and trade balances. Victor advocated
the final, and least calamitous of his scenarios, which was a stabilising of the
economy based on greater redistribution and state investment inter alia. Yet
how this state investment is to be financed was not touched upon in the analysis,
in spite of its importance for mitigating the tumultuousness of unstable economic
forces in this renewed international political economy.
A comprehensive analysis of the strain on welfare services cannot end here,
however. It is also fair to forecast that the strain on welfare services will be exacer-
bated by climate change; which would be mitigated but not halted by post-growth.
Firstly, a host of climate change adaptation projects will still be required and are
likely to be financed (at least partially) by the state. These projects will compound
the fiscal predicament of the state and create even greater fiscal competition within
the state departments for scarce monetary resources. Secondly, climate change
will itself create greater welfare need. A range of forecasts have estimated that
we will see an increase in climate migration, resource scarcity and flooding
(Stern 2007, IPCC 2012). Extreme weather events are likely to become frequent
and (as Hurricane Katrina showed) it is the poorest that will be less likely to
have adequate insurance and less able to escape affected areas (Meadowcroft
2008). Global supply chains will be persistently threatened, including those con-
nected to the food and fuel industries (Simms 2013). Less directly, the policy
actions necessary to drive the transition to environmental sustainability may
also generate welfare need. These include carbon and consumption taxes, which
are likely to hit the poorest the hardest. Gough (2013a) has demonstrated that
carbon mitigation policies tend to be regressive and, thus, will squeeze the
incomes of the low earners even further.
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The above are difficult to predict or quantify with any confidence as there is
little historical precedent for such changes and there will be a great deal of vari-
ation amongst the transitional economies. However, it is prudent to tentatively
project that additional costs to welfare states will be accrued. The onset of
climate change and the policies undertaken to make this transition to environ-
mental sustainability heralds a tumultuous time for the most vulnerable individ-
uals and communities in post-industrial societies. It ostensibly leaves us with
intensified tensions and a prospective funding gap in state finances. As Chancel
et al. (2013: 62) put it ‘weak growth makes social protection reforms all the
more necessary and all the more difficult’. Welfare states are unpropitiously pro-
jected to consume ever greater public resources ceteris paribus whilst the fiscal
capacity of the state to respond to welfare need is likely to shrink.
The post-growth literature has not yet systematically engaged with these impli-
cations. Prioritising welfare spending over other areas of public expenditure is cer-
tainly possible. Some limited space may exist for retrenchment in other areas of
the budget, and it is vital that post-growth exponents explore differing forms of
austerity measures. One would imagine, however, that a progressive post-
growth theorist when faced with such a quandary would attempt to calculate the
potential for cuts in other areas of state spending and the additional funds that
could be raised through taxation.
Chancel et al. (2013) remain bullish that these constraints can be significantly
mitigated by a renewed tax system and emphasise the agential space that remains
within these constraints. They argue that ‘it is not so much society’s economic
growth that matters, but rather the individual and collective choices we make’
(Chancel et al. 2013: 5). There are, however, significant limits to even the most
progressive architectures of taxation in a context where the very point of such tran-
sitions is to move towards economies based on lower levels of production, con-
sumption and work. The aim is to engender economies with lower levels of
output and, as a corollary, producing tax bases which are diminished.
A full discussion of progressive taxation can be found elsewhere, but there is a
point of diminishing returns to income tax and corporation tax. This is true even
under present conditions (particularly in age of ‘tax havens’) but it is even more
the case within a transition to post-growth where the very point is to suppress
carbon-intensive forms of economic activity. Green taxes on carbon, advertising
and selective VAT modifications (to both the rate and the commodities it is
levied upon) which facilitate the transition to environmental sustainability
would also be prudent. Yet these taxes will hardly be buoyant revenue streams
and even if they were they would (hopefully) constitute declining revenue
streams as environmentally harmonious behaviour becomes normalised.
Therefore, there would need to be a significant change in the emphasis of taxa-
tion towards ‘immovables’ on land and property, and perhaps even global forms of
taxation such as the one imposed upon wealth advocated by Piketty (2014). It
would be unwise to be prescriptive about the rates which could be applied to
immovable here – such an issue must remain open-ended and subject to the rel-
evant democratic processes – but it would be wise to view these areas of taxation
as the most lucrative long-term avenues of funding state activity in a post-growth
era.
The Environmental Paradox of the Welfare State
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Clearly, there are a range of taxation systems internationally, and the need to
enact reforms will be mediated by a plethora of democratic and political insti-
tutions and localised discourses. As such, it is sufficient to say that a more pro-
gressive system of taxation is a key political component of addressing the post-
growth funding gap, but that it must remain an open question. Clearly increases
in income, corporation, wealth, carbon and financial transaction taxes and a
clamp down on tax havens are capable of making a significant contribution and
can be seen as entirely equitable. Furthermore, international cooperation is
capable of mutually enabling progressive action on taxation as nations are able
to multilaterally widen the scope of each other’s tax bases, if they can avoid a dele-
terious race to the bottom.
In the face of such unknowable variables and political heterogeneity throughout
the heartlands of welfare capitalism, it would be prudent to remain sceptical that
simply relying on tax hikes is the start and end of this conversation. Ad infinitum
economic growth cannot be simply substituted in public accounts by a short-term
growth in taxation, particularly in light of the need to reduce governmental debt,
the growing welfare need brought about by contemporary circumstances and the
effects of the post-growth transition itself. These fiscal constraints and increasing
welfare need should breed a scepticism that post-industrial societies can continue
to enjoy welfare systems as robust as they have become accustomed to. As long as
nation-states operate within the monetary frameworks of capitalism, fiscal restric-
tions will continue to underwrite political action.
Indeed, moving beyond growth seemingly precipitates an invidious degree of
public sector retrenchment. This is tragically ironic for progressives who have
long resisted, understandably, the emaciation of state spending.
It is clear, then, that post-growth proposals have severe and unacknowledged
implications for the size and nature of the state. The end of growth provokes a
point of enormous tension between the left’s environmental sympathies (and a
broader social critique of GDP as a measurement of wellbeing) and the left’s
deep-seated tendency to view the state as an instrument of progressive politics
and welfare provision. This is profoundly unsettling. Should progressives then
eschew the notions of environmental sustainability put forward by the post-
growth literature in order to protect cherished social programmes and re-energise
efforts to inspire another, more inclusive wave of growth?
This may be a seductive conclusion, but it is entirely inadequate; not least
because current growth patterns carry ramifications for welfare need as well as
the planet. Growth itself (has generated costs to the welfare bill (although relation-
ships between the two differ from country to country), partly through its socio-
environmental effects.
A ‘business-as-usual’ approach may be seductive for some but it is clear that the
status quo invites ever greater socio-environmental risks and the exacerbation of
anthropogenic climate change (which ironically threatens economic growth sub-
sequently according to Stern 2007: xv). Indulging a set of environmentally illiter-
ate economic discourses will not allow us to come to terms with the ‘dilemma of
growth’, as Jackson (2009) termed it, or the need to reconcile our social and
environmental sensibilities. As Simms (2013: 62) dramatically stated: ‘econ-
omics . . . becomes redundant if it can rationalise an exchange that sells the
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future of humankind’; and the logic of indefinite welfare state expansion conforms
to this mode of economics. This thinking caused Gough and Therborn (2010: 757)
to state that ‘the 20th century formula of economic growth and social security/
justice will no longer be adequate’.
This is a key point for the academic literature on welfare state sustainability. Its
foci cannot continue to simply be upon state-funded programmes financed
indirectly by a carbon-intensive growth dynamic. In short, the academic literature
on welfare state sustainability needs to think about sustainability in a more sustain-
able way! That is to say, that it needs to factor in not only notions of fiscal sustain-
ability, but also the environmental sustainability of the economic system its
funding is derived from and in whose language this funding is justified.
This accumulation of fiscal, socio-environmental and economic pathologies
delivers a far more profound and systemic challenge to the welfare system than
at any other time in the post-war period. This does not alone spell out the inevi-
table demise of welfarism, but underlines the importance of a transformation
more radical than is currently being countenanced in public discourse.
The unsustainability of welfare state retrenchment?
The fiscal predicament of welfare states under post-growth conditions is clear.
Welfare states are financed by environmentally unsustainable growth dynamics
and, subsequently, they must be deemed environmentally unsustainable by
proxy if we are to make a transition towards post-growth sustainability.
However, we should remain sceptical of this logic also. This is because welfare
state retrenchment as aligned to an environmentally minded macroeconomic
shift could be environmentally deleterious and, thus, ultimately self-flagellating.
This is not least because of the higher environmental footprint of privatised ser-
vices which are concerned purely with profit compared to their counterparts in the
public sector. By way of comparison, Chung and Meltzer highlight that the US
healthcare system is reported to be accountable for 8 per cent of total CO2 emis-
sions, whereas in the UK the National Health Service is accountable for only 3 per
cent of total emissions (SDC 2008); a disparity largely due to upstream supply
chain procurement according to Chung and Meltzer (2009) themselves. Thus, if
we are to assume that privatisation and state retrenchment are two sides of the
same coin, retrenchment may well lead to even greater ecological degradation.
The higher carbon output attributable to private services demonstrates the
extent to which decarbonisation can be facilitated by a larger public sector less
prone to the profit motive and more likely to account for ecological considerations.
The ecological output of privatised health care has led some to conclude that ‘a
free market and insurance-based healthcare system . . . might struggle to reach
lower levels of CO2 emissions’ found in comparable public healthcare systems
(Nordensvard 2013: 69). There is, therefore, cause for concern that privatising col-
lective public goods and basing them on a criteria even more fixated on cost and
profit could exacerbate environmental degradation.
Furthermore, it appears that privatised services consume a greater proportion of
monetary resources as well as ecological resources! Maintaining a myopic and
asymmetrical focus on public sector spending may lead us to think that any
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reduction in costs would be beneficial to ‘the taxpayer’. Yet the example of health
care demonstrates that this is not necessarily the case. European governments
furthering the trend of privatising vital healthcare services ostensibly serves to lat-
erally shift the costs from the public sector finances towards the finances of house-
holds. Rather than a way of cutting costs, it is instead a way of shifting expenditure
from the collective balance sheet to the individual. Taking this broader view of
finances is important as the OECD data seems to illustrate as a percentage of
GDP just how reasonable nationalised models of health care are (OECD 2012).
As the comparative OECD graph shows (Figure 1), attempting to reduce the
financial burdens on the state may be counter-productive if it is realised through
the privatisation of healthcare services as those countries inclined towards such
models of health care tend to be less cost-efficient as a percentage of overall
GDP. The constriction of national resources brought about by a post-growth tran-
sition is, thus, an even greater incentive to collective healthcare services in a cost-
effective manner. Privatisation derived from the maintenance of an asymmetrical
focus on the state’s finances cannot be considered an optimal approach under such
conditions.
The asymmetrical focus on public finances and the state is also palpable in the
debate on pensions, as an ageing society has harnessed calls for a reduction of state
spending by encouraging private pension saving. But this discursive framing also
produces fallacious conclusions. As Esping-Andersen notes,
if it is our aim to sustain our welfare commitments, shifting the
costs to either market transactions or to familial support will not
reduce the amount of additional resources that need to be mobi-
lised. The elderly of the future may perhaps absorb less
FIGURE 1. Total health expenditure per capita, public and private, 2010 (or nearest year)
Source: OECD (2012).
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government expenditure, but that does not mean that they will
absorb less of the national GDP. (2009: 150–1)
Examining both public and private healthcare costs is instructive in determining if
and how welfare costs can be brought down. If it is true that the transition to sus-
tainability implies some form of public sector retrenchment, it would be impru-
dent to ignore the substantial private costs and public sector risks which
accompany the individualisation and privatisation of welfare provision.
The argument that collective provision of welfare services is more appropriate
in age of constrained ecological and monetary resources is only aided by the
wealth of evidence which demonstrates that decarbonisation strategies are accel-
erated by the presence of robust welfare states. Perhaps the most significant eco-
logical rationale for a robust welfare regime is that they possess the ability to
fundamentally modify how citizens relate to each other and the planet. Large
welfare states are able to alleviate inequalities and engender a stronger sense of
community and the ‘public good’; all of which tends to promote decarbonisation
strategies.
The core message of Wilkinson and Pickett’s The Spirit Level (2009) was that
more equal societies perform better on a range of indices, including those relating
to ecological footprints. It is difficult to explaining these correlations with confi-
dence or precision, but there is a sense in which inequality seems to erode com-
munity spirit and social responsibility – or what Putnam (2000) referred to as
‘social capital’. These trends intersect with the notion that ‘policies to reduce
carbon emissions depend on a wider sense of social responsibility, of co-operation
and public spiritedness’ (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009: 227).
Therborn (2014) more recently made the point that ‘increasing social distance
between the poorest and the richest diminishes social cohesion, which in turn
means more collective problems and fewer resources for solving all our other col-
lective problems’. The Harvard philosopher, Michael Sandel, concurred in the
2009 Reith Lectures that ‘a common citizenship so that people from different
walks of life encounter one another and so acquire . . . a sense of a shared life’
was useful in cultivating civic virtue and enabling individuals to ‘meaningfully
think of one another as citizens in a common venture’ (Sandel 2009).
In the individualistic, consumer cultures of the Anglophone world it has been
difficult to promote a sense of the public good or for the state to take decisive
action, but in more equal societies with a stronger sense of civic virtue ‘institutions
and political culture enable an interventionist state acting to promote the public
good’ (Gough and Meadowcroft 2011: 500). Accordingly, research has shown
that people in individualised, unequal and liberal economies tend to have higher
per capita carbon emissions (Kasser 2001) and be more resistant to environmental
legislation comparison to countries in Scandinavia and the Netherlands (Dryzek
cited in Gerhards and Lengfeld 2008, Gough et al. 2008).
Furthermore, inequality appears to constitute a significant barrier to instigating
environmental change through the price mechanism. Changing prices through
carbon taxation (to reflect the environmental costs of emissions) is recognised
as one of the primary levers available to governments hoping to encourage low-
carbon behaviour, yet it has been shown that this lever is significantly less
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effective in unequal countries as the relatively affluent tend to be immune from
price rises designed to engender more sustainable consumption patterns (Weitz-
man 1977). This is known as the Weitzman paradox. More equality thus seems
to aid the effectiveness of the price in prompting environmentally judicious
change.
Following on from this point, the relationship between inequality and the
environment is also important in terms of levels and types of consumerism,
with citizens in more unequal countries tending to indulge in higher levels of con-
spicuous, carbon-intensive and disposable consumption (Druckman and Jackson
2009, Wilkinson and Pickett 2009: 222, Gough et al. 2011). Current consumption
patterns have accumulated economic, social and environmental critiques in recent
years for their carbon-intensive, conspicuous and debt-fuelled character. Not
transforming these consumption patterns through significant state intervention
and redistribution is simply not an option if we are to make this shift towards a
sustainable society.
Redistributing disposable income, partly through the apparatus of welfare
states, acts as a catalyst for engendering more environmentally sustainable con-
sumption patterns as well as allocating national resources more equitably. Follow-
ing Wilkinson and Pickett (2009: 215),
given what inequality does to a society, and particularly how it
heightens competitive consumption, it looks not only as if the
two are complimentary, but also that governments may be unable
to make big enough cuts in carbon emissions without also reducing
inequality.
We should not understate the importance of a robust welfare regime in instigating
this behaviour. Gough and Meadowcroft (2011) speculated that
it may well be that different welfare states will prove more or less
capable of arriving at effective and equitable solutions, returning us
to the distinction between different welfare regimes . . . evidence
within the developed world that welfare regimes map on to
environmental regimes.
Indeed, the values which underpin an effective response to climate change – altru-
ism rather than egoism, collectivism rather than individualism, cooperation rather
than competition, inter-dependence rather than inequalities, de-commodification
rather than the free market – seem to also promote the core values underpinning
public welfarism. The interdependencies between the two are considerable.
Research suggests that it is social democratic countries with more substantial
welfare regimes which will more effectively be able to prioritise the reduction
of their carbon footprints (Gerhards and Lengfeld 2008).
The question, therefore, perhaps should not be: is the welfare state fiscally sus-
tainable? But rather: is welfare state retrenchment environmentally sustainable?
There is cause to believe that welfare state retrenchment policies are a self-flagel-
lating policy direction even if aligned with an environmentally minded post-
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growth transition. Welfare states can, thus, be seen as vital transitional mechan-
isms, if only because they are more environmentally sustainable than the priva-
tised alternatives.
Therefore, there remains an ecological and financial rationale to the collective,
single-payer model of welfare services, which should be taken into account when
discussing welfare sustainability. Martyring public provision of essential services
in order to cut costs would at the aggregate level constitute an extremely self-
defeating policy direction. Substantial mechanisms of collective action can con-
tinue to be vital in keeping aggregate costs down as well as protecting the
poorest and most vulnerable in our societies.
There is a parallel here with the work of Bruce Weston in that there seems to be
financial costs of preserving only a residual welfare regime. This is a more
environmental argument, but it is still worth deliberating the stark ramifications
of welfare retrenchment and privatisation in this scenario (as well as the effects
this has on inequality and social mobility) upon healthcare costs, education and
the potential costs of increased criminality that can accompany reduced state
support and growths in inequality (Weston 1999, Wilkinson and Pickett 2009, Jen-
nings et al. 2012).
All of this is to marginalise the more normative case that combining pre-exist-
ing inequalities and vulnerabilities with the socio-economic implications of both
climate change and the transition to post-growth conditions ethically demands
social models which de-commodify market forces and protects the most vulner-
able. If regressive welfare retrenchment were to accompany the radically destabi-
lising processes of climate change and economic reform, it is difficult to forecast
anything other than a painful and counter-productive transitional period. In this
scenario, social unrest and distributional questions would surely arise from con-
siderations of social justice. Chancel et al. (2013: 4/59) make this case and they
conclude ‘a low-growth society . . . needs to redouble its efforts as far as redistri-
bution is concerned’ and that this could be achieved still through ‘taxation, social
protection and legal means’.
Welfare states, therefore, have prominent roles to play in any transition towards
low-carbon economies and their pervasive retrenchment at the current time should
be regarded as environmentally unsustainable. Paradoxically, this is the case even
if aligned to a post-growth mentality of governance which circumscribes the
state’s fiscal capacity. If the hypothesis of the post-growth literature that environ-
mental sustainability cannot be reconciled with growth is correct, then it appears
as if the transition towards environmental sustainability cannot live with, or be
operationalised without, robust welfare states.
Conclusion
Bringing together these literatures, therefore, generates significant insights for the
analysis of welfare state sustainability and brings us to this incongruity. The
transition to an environmentally sustainable economy may rely upon a constriction
of economic activity but it also relies upon a mode of governance which
possesses the ability to reduce inequalities, engender new consumption
patterns (partly through redistribution), insure against collective risks and
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de-commodify market forces. The evidence seems to indicate that welfare states
are a precondition for any developmental path which successfully reduces
carbon output.
The traditional solutions for promoting a positive outlook for the welfare state
– specifically, more growth, tax and expenditure – are no longer acceptable, at
least normatively, when we adopt a more sophisticated notion of welfare state sus-
tainability. The warranted claims of the post-growth movement, however quixotic
it remains, problematise these traditional solutions. So where do we go from here?
One thing is for sure, we cannot simply resort to welfare state abatement, which
appears to be a self-flagellating policy direction. Concerns over the fiscal sustain-
ability of the welfare state are therefore pertinent, but we should be equally
attempting to determine the extent to which welfare state retrenchment is sustain-
able in light of socio-environmental interdependencies.
Two routes forward for policy-makers are clear. Firstly, the ceteris paribus
assumptions made about taxation here need to be interrogated. The issues relating
to tax collection have already been discussed, but a more progressive architecture
of taxation would surely be part of the policy response to such phenomena. Taxes
on not only income but on wealth would still garner significant amounts, particu-
larly if coordinated internationally. Secondly, perhaps it would be wise to meditate
on why we require welfare states of this size in the first place. In many respects
they offer a range of public services which are both cost-effective and relatively
low carbon. Yet in other respects welfare states are concerned with mitigating
the shortcomings of particular growth models (which entail differing levels of
welfare expenditure) through redistribution. From this perspective, a smaller
welfare state would perhaps be entirely acceptable as long as it is embedded
with a wider economic system which provides relatively egalitarian outcomes
without such a reliance on the state. This clearly dovetails with the research
conducted on ‘predistribution’ (Hacker 2011), those who advocate a cap on the
costs of housing, the health effects of inequality (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009,
Therborn 2014) and preventative health care (Gough 2013b), the redistribution
of work through a recalibration of convention work–life balances (Skidelsky
and Skidelsky 2012), and how such a reconfiguration of work–life balance
could be married off to a postponement in the retirement age in order to reduce
the cost of public pensions (NEF 2010: 21); all of which would allow for poten-
tially progressive modes of welfare state retrenchment, however bizarre that
notion sounds.
These are already quite radical recommendations in that they go against the
grain of the current political settlement, but these policy routes are likely to be
only very partial solutions. As such, it may also be worth questioning whether
maintaining the realist-inspired ontological centrality of the state is an optimal
mode of analysing and constructing welfare policy. What is more urgently
required in such a context is a more profound renewal of the welfare state
which spans multiple levels of governance. For example, certain co-production
approaches complement state welfarism with an attempt to tackle and manage
certain forms of welfare need at the local or community level.2 Projects such as
Time Banking (NEF 2008), which allows citizen to contribute their time and
skills in areas such as elderly care and mental health care, operate outside the
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market economy and would hold clear relevance here. At the international level, a
broader set of institutions perhaps under the jurisdiction of the European Union or
the G20 could feasibly set the parameters for state expenditure through coordinat-
ing inter alia deficit reduction, financial sector regulation and investment policy,
or indeed implement welfare policies at the supranational level (Deacon 2007).
Such policy coordination would multilaterally widen the policy-space for states
to pursue more expansive fiscal policies. The existing state institutions of welfar-
ism will continue to play prominent roles but they would be situated within a
broader and more diverse set of institutional arrangements. A renewal of welfar-
ism on these lines would be appropriate and urgently required in a post-growth
economy and society.
The policy routes offered here are certainly not ‘meta-solutions’, but instead
fruitful and open-ended (if flawed) ways of thinking beyond the accumulation
of problems and paradoxes in this nascent research area. There is a need here to
theorise more intensely on the intractability of these problems and the radicalness
of the policy approaches they demand. Sadly, it is currently difficult to be sanguine
about the future of public welfarism or the planet within a political economy fra-
mework centred upon conventional ideas and institutions.
Acknowledgements
I would also like to thank Prof. Colin Hay, Dr Owen Parker and Xavier Mathieu for their insightful comments
which have undoubtedly strengthened the paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Funding
I am grateful for the financial support of the UK Economic and Social Research Council which has allowed me to
conduct my research.
Notes
1. I do not intend to explore the feasibility of a ‘green growth’ paradigm here, but will simply use the post-growth
hypothesis – that environmental sustainability is irreconcilable with ad infinitum economic growth – as the
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